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Abstract
Purpose – Aircraft availability (AA) is a keymetric for assessing operational readiness. The declining trend
in AA is a documented concern for senior Air Force leaders. This paper aims to investigate the components of
non-available time and subsequently focuses on the largest and fastest growing category: not mission capable
maintenance unscheduled (NMCMU). Then, utilization of aircraft platforms is examined to determine the
readiness beneﬁts of increasing available hours.
Design/methodology/approach – Stepwise regression is conducted on a data set of 30 aircraft
platforms, consisting of 542 observations from 1998 to 2017, to reveal drivers of NMCMU. Next, utilization of
aircraft platforms is examined through regression and correlation analysis of aircraft platforms and sorties or
hours ﬂown.
Findings – Regression analysis reveals drivers of NMCMU include platform type, average age of aircraft,
ﬂeet size, breaks and cannibalization. These factors explain 80.6 per cent of the variance in the data set when
predicting NMCMU. Additionally, the utilization results show that when more hours are made available, 5
per cent of each new hour is used for ﬂying. Further analysis at the individual platform level ﬁnds a strong or
moderate correlation between available hours and sorties ﬂown for 93 per cent of the platforms.
Originality/value – Implications from the regression analysis demonstrate there are remedies to increase
AA, but many of these remedies may be costly. The utilization analysis expresses the potential readiness
beneﬁts of increasing available hours.
Keywords Regression, Maintenance, Utilization, Aircraft availability
Paper type Research paper
The readiness of the US Air Force (USAF) ﬂeet is receiving increasing attention from military
leaders, defense think tanks and the media (Government Accountability Ofﬁce, 2017; Losey,
2018). While mission capable (MC) rates remain the predominant metric used to assess
availability at the unit level, aircraft availability (AA) has become the preferred statistic in the
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USAF for ﬂeet assessment of operational readiness (McAneny, 2009; Rainey et al., 2009). As a
result, the air force has developed standard targets for availability to reﬂect the aircraft needed
to support operational, training and surge capability (Air Force Instruction 21-103, 2016). The
data, however, showAA in the USAF has been in a state of decline over the past 25 years. This
trend is drawing the concern of Air Force senior leaders (Brissett, 2017).
While the overarching AA statistic has garnered signiﬁcant attention, an understanding of
the underlying components that result in non-available time is lacking. Thus, the purpose of
this article is to examine one of the largest components of aircraft readiness, the not mission
capable maintenance (NMCM) segment of downtime. The analysis is designed to identify
trigger events and through regression analysis determine the drivers of NMCM. Additionally,
key assumptions underlying interpretations of the AA metric are examined. From this, the
intuition behind linkages in total active inventory (TAI) and AA is explored. Finally, aircraft
utilization is examined to understand the operational impact of increasing available hours.
Background and literature view
Over the past 10 years, the USAF has made a deliberate shift from MC rates to AA rates as
the metric of choice in assessing the enterprise (Rainey et al., 2009). The change materialized
in response to the desire for an enterprise-wide metric. MC rates are calculated by capturing
only the readiness of aircraft that are currently possessed at the unit level (e.g. aircraft
awaiting maintenance at a depot are not included in MC calculations). In contrast, the AA
statistic accounts for all aircraft in the ﬂeet. In its simplest form, AA is the percentage of
time aircraft are available to accomplish mission requirements. It answers the basic
question: Howmany aircraft are ready to ﬂy? The AA rate is calculated using equation (1):
AARate %ð Þ ¼ MCHours
TAI Hours
 100 (1)
AA is considered a key element of air force readiness. As a result, negative changes in AA rates
are concerning to senior leaders (Brissett, 2017). Figure 1 shows the AA rate has declined from
a high of approximately 75 per cent in the early 1990s to a current low of about 62 per cent.
Figure 1.
AA rates 1991-2017
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While Figure 1 demonstrates AA is declining over time, it does not provide insight into the
factors driving the phenomenon. To understand this, it is ﬁrst imperative to delineate the
various components of non-available time. As shown in Figure 2, there are ﬁve main
components of downtime: depot, NMCM, not mission capable supply (NMCS), not mission
capable both (NMCB) and unit possessed not reported (UPNR).
Explanations of the ﬁve non-available (downtime) categories from Figure 2 are as
follows: Depot status is for aircraft possessed by a depot for maintenance or overhaul activities.
NMCM status is the percentage of aircraft that are not operationally available because of
maintenance being performed at the unit level. This includes the subcategories of scheduled
and unscheduled maintenance at the unit level. NMCS status is the percentage of aircraft that
are not operationally available for supply reasons such as waiting for spare parts. NMCB status
is the percentage of aircraft that are unavailable because of both maintenance and supply
reasons. Finally, UPNR status refers to instances where an aircraft is waiting on a decision
from another agency regarding how to proceed. In this case, the aircraft is unit possessed but
not reported upon until further instructions are received (Fry, 2010).
The contribution of each non-available status to total non-availability from 1991-2017 is
depicted in Figure 3. Depot and NMCM are the two largest categories of non-availability and
Figure 3.
Percentage of total
non-availability time
by category
Figure 2.
Components of non-
available time
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together make up an average of 67 per cent of total non-available hours. However, the depot
category has seen improvement over the past 17 years, while NMCM has been growing
during this same time period. A clear understanding of this growth warrants further
exploration and scopes the remainder of this analysis to NMCM. Figure 2 shows there are
two primary subcategories of NMCM: not mission capable maintenance scheduled
(NMCMS) and not mission capable maintenance unscheduled (NMCMU). NMCMS is the
maintenance conducted at the unit level for regularly scheduled maintenance, such as
periodic inspections. NMCMU is all the other maintenance activities occurring at the unit
level, not associated with scheduled maintenance. On an average, NMCMS comprises 28 per
cent of NMCM, with NMCMU comprising the remaining 72 per cent.
Prior to analyzing NMCM, two relevant trends that draw the concern of Air Force leaders
are highlighted. First, as shown in Figure 4, the TAI is on a downward glide path. The
aircraft inventory has decreased by approximately 31 per cent over the past 25 years. At the
same time, the age of the air force ﬂeet is also increasing. The average age has increased by
approximately 61 per cent, from 17 years in 1991 to 27.4 years in 2017. These trends are not
a surprise as much has been written about the aging ﬂeet (National Research Council, 1997;
Pyles, 2003; Ulshoffer et al., 2005; Thompson, 2018) and the declining inventory
(Government Accountability Ofﬁce, 2016; Heritage Foundation, 2016). Discussion centered
on these trends, along with the decreasing AA rate, tend to elicit bleak forecasts of the Air
Force’s ability to meet future readiness requirements (Government Accountability Ofﬁce,
2016; Everstine, 2017).
The fact that AA is decreasing (see Figure 1) at the same time TAI is decreasing (see
Figure 4) appears, on the surface, to be a conundrum. Why isn’t AA stable? Recall from
equation (1) that TAI hours is the denominator in the AA rate equation. The inherent
problem is an erroneous inference that a drop in TAI will result in a proportional drop in
non-available hours, thereby holding AA relatively steady over time. The logic seems to
follow that with fewer aircraft to maintain, there will be fewer breaks, less scheduled
maintenance and less overall downtime. In other words, a common assumption is non-
available hours are linked to the number of aircraft being maintained (or in inventory),
Figure 4.
TAI and average
aircraft age 1991-2017
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instead of perhaps stronger linkages to ﬂuctuations in manpower, ﬂying hours, aircraft age
or other factors. A logical solution is to see if these assumptions hold up under data analysis.
Figure 5 shows non-available hours are demonstrating a rather meager decline and certainly
not keeping proportional pace with the reductions in TAI hours. When comparing non-
available hours in context with available and TAI hours, the picture indicates available
hours mirror the declining TAI hours (see Figure 5). Given these facts, the math follows that
AA percentage will naturally decline over time.
The relative stability in non-available hours over time is perhaps not intuitive on the
surface, but there are many factors that likely contribute to this stability, some of which are:
 Scheduled aircraft maintenance in the USAF is primarily completed on an hours-
ﬂown basis.
 Trigger events for unscheduled maintenance (aborts, breaks, pilot reported
discrepancies, etc.) typically happen when planes ﬂy.
 The way in which excess capacity is used in maintenance functions potentially
mitigates ﬂuctuations (e.g. depots).
Though this is far from a complete list of possible factors, it does illustrate many factors are
not tied directly to TAI, which is the underlying assumption many make when assuming
AAwill remain steady while TAI is decreasing.
The insights illuminated thus far point to non-available time as the key piece to
understanding the dynamics of AA. The relatively stable nature of non-available hours is
driving the AA rate downward as TAI decreases. Thus, the remainder of this paper
examines potential explanatory variables for the NMCM segment of non-available time.
Methods
The primary data source for regression analysis is the USAF’s maintenance data repository –
Logistics, Installations andMission Support-Enterprise View (LIMS-EV). To ensure robustness
of platforms selected for inclusion, the platform must have 10 years of availability data and a
Figure 5.
Comparison of
available, non-
available and TAI
hours
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ﬂeet size of at least ten aircraft in multiple years of the data. Additionally, the platform must
have corresponding utilization and maintenance data in LIMS-EV. The ﬁnal data set contains
30 aircraft platforms (542 observations) from 1998 to 2017. Table I shows the ﬁnal set of
included platforms and the exclusion screens for non-selected platforms.
Recall that NMCM comprises both scheduled and unscheduled components. Scheduled
maintenance, by deﬁnition, is known or predictable maintenance requirements, often based
on time or hours ﬂown on an aircraft (Air Force Technical Order 00-20-1, 2016). This makes
the non-availability hours associated with the scheduled maintenance portion intuitive. As a
result, the regression is designed to investigate only the unscheduled component. Thus, the
dependent variable is NMCMU hours per aircraft. Independent, predictor variables come
from LIMS-EV. These include average age of the aircraft, ﬂeet size, hours ﬂown per aircraft
and a multitude of utilization and maintenance variables discussed in the next section.
Independent variables are standardized on a per-aircraft basis by platform to control for the
variance in the number of aircraft in the inventory.
Prior to any model building, the regression data set is separated into two groups: the model
building data set and validation data set. For multiple regression, a random sampling of the
data uses approximately 80 per cent for the model building portion and 20 per cent for the
validation set. Variables may or may not be included in the model, depending on individual
signiﬁcance and contingent on passing regression diagnostics. The mixed stepwise function in
JMP Pro Version 12 is used to determine which predictor variables are initially included in the
model. A signiﬁcance level of 0.05 is the threshold to enter or exit the model. The assumption of
normality is assessed using the Shapiro–Wilk test and a plot of the studentized residuals, while
the assumption of constant variance is assessed with the Breusch–Pagan test and a residual by
predicted plot. Both tests are conducted at the 0.05 level of signiﬁcance.
Furthermore, multicollinearity, inﬂuential data points and outliers are investigated to
prevent additional bias. Variance inﬂation factors (VIF) highlight linear relationships
between two explanatory variables, and a VIF higher than 10 indicates multicollinearity.
Cook’s distance detects inﬂuential data points that could be skewing the model, and any
value greater than 0.5 is investigated thoroughly. Any studentized residual that is greater
than three standard deviations from the mean is considered an outlier and must also be
investigated further. The ﬁnal assessment is the Holm–Bonferroni correction, which aims
to control the family-wise error rate and reduce Type I error (false positives).
Once all diagnostics are passed, the model building set is validated against the validation
set using multiple criteria: mean absolute percentage error (MAPE), median absolute
percentage error (MdAPE) and adjusted R2. When the model is deemed internally valid, then
Table I.
Platforms
Exclusion screen Platforms
Less than 10 TAI AT-38, C-9, C-32, C-37, C-38, C-40, CV-22, E-4, E-9, LC-130, MH-61, NC-130, NKC-135,
OC-135, RQ-4, T-43, TC-130, TC-135, TE-8, UV-18, VC-25, WC-135
Less than 10 years
of data
EF-111, F-35, F-111, FB-111, OV-10, RF-4
Less than 10 years
of data and TAI
A-7, A-37, C-18, C-22, C-26, C-27, C-29, C-135, C-137, C-141, EC-18, EC-135, EC-137,
F-4, F-106, H-3, H-53, HH-1, HH-3, MC-12, MH-60, NA-37, NC-135, NC-141, NCH-53,
NF-4, NT-39, NCH-53, NRF-4, T-3, T-39, T-41, TC-18, TH-53, UC-26, UH-60
Lack of break data C-5, C-12, C-21, KC-10, WC-130
Included A-10, AC-130, B-1, B-2, B-52, C-17, C-20, C-130, E-3, E-8, EC-130, F-15, F-15E, F-16,
F-22, KC-135, MH-53, MQ-1, MQ-9, RC-135, T-1, T-6, T-37, T-38, UH-1
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all data points are combined to update the ﬁnal model using the variables selected from the
model building process.
Non-availability regression results
The regression is designed to provide insight into the drivers of NMCMU. Independent
variables in the model were selected based on the literature review and corresponding data
in LIMS-EV. Initial multivariate plots of all predictor variables, in addition to VIF scores,
provided insight into multicollinearity issues and removal of variables from the model. The
ﬁnal set of independent variables for inclusion in the model is shown in Table II.
The initial regression diagnostics indicated several severe outliers in the data set.
Speciﬁcally, the B-2 platform data is six standard deviations from the mean. The B-2 is the
Air Force’s only stealth bomber. The radar-absorbent materials and coatings of the large
aircraft among other unique structural stealth capabilities require signiﬁcantly more
maintenance per hour ﬂown than other bomber aircraft. For these reasons, the B-2 was
removed from the data set.
With the data set ﬁnalized, stepwise regression was run on the model building set. Several
independent variables were found insigniﬁcant and removed from the model during the
stepwise regression process: hours ﬂown per aircraft, mean time between maintenance,
repeats/recur per aircraft and year. Additionally, statistical signiﬁcance below the comparison-
Table II.
Independent
variables in the
regression analysis
Name
Type of
variable Description Measuring Source
Platform Binary There are 30 individual aircraft
platforms, as delineated in Table I. The
base case is the A-10
Technology,
complexity, etc.
LIMS-EV
Aircraft age Continuous Average age of all aircraft in the
corresponding platform
Effects of age LIMS-EV
Hours ﬂown per
aircraft
Continuous Average hours ﬂown per aircraft Usage LIMS-EV
Breaks per aircraft Continuous Average breaks incurred per aircraft Reliability LIMS-EV
Sorties per aircraft Continuous Average sorties ﬂown per aircraft Usage LIMS-EV
Aborts per aircraft Continuous Average missions aborted on the ground
or in the air per aircraft
Reliability LIMS-EV
Cannibalization Continuous Average removals of a serviceable part
from an aircraft or engine to replace an
unserviceable part on another aircraft or
engine
Maintenance
practice
LIMS-EV
Repeat/recur per
aircraft
Continuous Average times a repeat discrepancy
occurs on the same system or subsystem
on the ﬁrst through fourth sorties
attempt after originally reported
Maintenance
quality, test
equipment, etc.
LIMS-EV
Mean Time Between
maintenance (hours)
Continuous Represents the average time between all
maintenance actions, both corrective and
preventive in hours
Reliability LIMS-EV
Year Binary Includes years 1998-2017 Fluctuations in
requirements
LIMS-EV
Fleet size Continuous Number of aircraft in the inventory by
platform type
Scale effects LIMS-EV
Pilot reported
discrepancy (PRD)
per aircraft
Continuous Average number of times a pilot reported
a discrepancy per aircraft
Pilot assessment LIMS-EV
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wise error Holm–Bonferroni correction rate of 0.05/9 = 0.005 resulted in the removal of the
sorties variable. Next, the 80 per cent model building set is validated against the 20 per cent
validation set. Comparison of MAPE (10.10 per cent training vs 11.06 per cent validation) and
MdAPE (14.96 per cent training vs 15.32 per cent validation) between the models are within 1.5
per cent of each other. The similarity of these results indicates themodel is valid.
After model validation, all the data points are combined into a ﬁnal model. Using the
variables selected from the model building process in the full data set, parameter estimates
are updated. Table III shows the ﬁnal model regression results.
The R2 of the model is 0.806, indicating that 80.6 per cent of the variance is explained by the
model. Checking for multicollinearity, the largest VIF score is 8.31, which falls below the
threshold of 10. All other variables have VIF scores of ﬁve or less. This indicates there is little
multicollinearity in the model. Similarly, the presence of inﬂuential data points is very minor.
The largest Cook’s distance value is 0.04, which is well below the 0.50 threshold. One of the
underlying assumptions of regression models is normality of the residuals. The Shapiro–Wilk
test resulted in a statistical failure of this assumption. However, a plot of the studentized
residuals shows that the residuals follow the bell-shape curve of a normal distribution. The
deviation from the normal curve is that more values are centered on zero than a normal
distribution. This can be considered a soft fail of the test as values centered on zero are
acceptable, whereas large spikes on the histogram tails are unacceptable (Cohen et al., 2003).
The independent variables from Table III provide several interesting insights. First,
platform type matters when it comes to non-available hours. This indicates that future
investigations into NMCMU should focus on platforms, rather than the enterprise level. Second,
age is important. As the positive coefﬁcient on this variable indicates, downtime increases as
the average age of the platform increases. This result resonates with the repeated concerns of
senior USAF leaders on the perils of an aging ﬂeet. Third, cannibalization can have some
positive impacts on downtime. The practice of cannibalization of a few aircraft is positively
correlated with increased availability time. This is not to say there are no negatives to
cannibalization. Negative impacts related to inventory, increased maintenance man hours and
decreased morale from cannibalization are well documented in the literature (General
Accounting Ofﬁce, 2001; Salman et al., 2007). The regression simply shows that the beneﬁt of
cannibalizing parts in the absence of spares can result in reduced maintenance turnaround
time. Fourth, ﬂeet size matters. As the size of the ﬂeet increases, the associated downtime per
aircraft decreases. Perhaps this is because of some scale efﬁciencies being realized. It is
important to note, however, the ﬂeet size’s relative contribution to the model (as determined
through the standard beta) is the least of all the variables. Additionally, the sign of the
coefﬁcient corroborates the previous discussion on the presumed conundrum of falling TAI
and the associated drop in AA. While the negative coefﬁcient sign means that increasing ﬂeet
size will result in less downtime, the converse is also true. The reality is that the USAF is
Table III.
Regression results
Predictor variable Estimate p-value Standardized beta Variance inflation factor
Intercept 607.72 < 0.0001 N/A N/A
Aircraft age 6.73 < 0.0001 0.30 3.21
Breaks 10.17 < 0.0001 0.44 3.35
Platform Various < 0.0001 Various Various
Cannibalization 10.54 < 0.0001 0.29 2.84
PRD 0.79 < 0.0001 0.30 5.38
Fleet size 0.27 < 0.0001 0.23 8.31
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experiencing decreasing ﬂeet sizes. This decrease in ﬂeet size actually correlates with an
increase in non-available time, which negatively impacts the AA rate. Thus, the regression
lends support to the previous discussion on the mathematical mechanics of the AA equation
with respect to the underlying assumption that decreasing TAI will lead to a proportional
decrease in non-available hours.
Utilization
Implications from the regression analysis show that there are remedies to increasing AA.
However, the cost and feasibility of these remedies must be considered. For example, the age
of the ﬂeet is a signiﬁcant factor in downtime. To reverse this through the retirement of
older aircraft and procurement of new aircraft is extremely expensive. Similarly, ﬂeet size
was found to be a driver of non-availability. But it is difﬁcult to retroactively change ﬂeet
size decisions. As these two examples illustrate, there needs to be the potential for
signiﬁcant beneﬁts prior to making these types of costly and difﬁcult decisions in the
acquisition cycle. Therefore, we examine utilization of available hours. The purpose is to
help answer the following question: do we ﬂy more hours or sorties when given more
available hours? The answer to this can help decision-makers trade off the costs of more
availability with the associated beneﬁts.
We analyze utilization through two approaches. First, an ordinary least squares
regression model on the total data set is developed. Hours ﬂown is the dependent variable in
the model. Controlling for platform type, available hours is found to be a very signiﬁcant
variable with a p-value of < 0.0001. This indicates that as available ﬂeet hours increase, the
ﬂeets ﬂy more. The coefﬁcient on the available hours variable is 0.05. The interpretation is
that for every additional hour made available, 5 per cent of that hour is used for ﬂying. How
does that compare to current utilization? Interestingly, current ﬂeet-wide average utilization
of available hours is about 7 per cent. Thus, the regression coefﬁcient substantiates what is
seen in the ﬁeld today. It is important to note, however, that the regression results show
correlation, not causation. It is plausible that the reverse is true: pressures to ﬂy more results
in maintainers making more aircraft hours available. Regardless of the direction of causation,
the essential takeaway is that available hours and hours ﬂown are correlated.
Some may argue that the Air Force should not expend resources to improve AA if only 5 per
cent of additional hours will be used for ﬂying. Robust analysis of the reasons behind this low
percentage of utilization is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research. However,
we do provide some considerations for future researchers when addressing the issue. The AA
metric presumes the Air Force needs aircraft available 24 h/day. In truth, much of what the air
force does is ﬂy training sorties during the day and has aircraft sit idle, but available, on the ﬂight
line the remaining hours of the day. Therefore, the 5 per cent utilization ﬁgure potentially
undersells the impact that improvements toAAhave on theAir Forcemission.
The second approach to analyzing utilization is through analysis at the individual
mission design (MD) level. There are two parts to this investigation. Correlations between
available hours and sorties is examined as are correlations between available hours and
hours ﬂown. Results are shown in Table IV.
Using a threshold of greater than 0.75, strong correlations are found for 18 of 30 platforms
between available hours and sorties ﬂown. Ten additional platforms have moderate correlation
(deﬁned as 0.5-0.74). One platform has minor correlation (deﬁned as 0.26-0.49). Only one
platform is found to have weak correlation (deﬁned as less than 0.25) between available hours
and sorties ﬂown. Similarly, 22 of 30 platforms have strong correlations between available
hours and hours ﬂown, while only one has a weak correlation.
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The overarching ﬁnding, therefore, is that availability appears to be a limiting factor for
utilization of USAF ﬂeets. This is not to say that it is the only limiting factor. Crew
availability and funding are just two examples of other resources posing possible limiting
constraints. The validity of those factors is not explored and is beyond the scope of this
paper. The results here simply show that increasing available hours is correlated with
additional hours and sorties ﬂown.
Conclusion
AA has decreased from 75 per cent in the 1990s to a current low of only 62 per cent. The
downward trend has drawn the concern of USAF senior leaders. This paper’s investigation of the
phenomenon reveals several interesting insights. First, the intuition behind decreasing TAI and
assumed proportional decreases in non-available hours is not borne out. The data shows non-
available hours remaining nearly constant. Owing to the mechanics of the calculation of the AA
statistic, this mathematically necessitates that AA decreases along with TAI. In other words, AA
has become so intricately linked to USAF planning and operating that there is a tendency to
overlook the metric’s shortcomings. Second, we ﬁnd NMCM is the largest component of
downtime. NMCM is also the fastest growing category of downtime, with unscheduled
maintenance comprising the largest segment of NMCM. Drivers for NMCMU include age,
platform type and ﬂeet size, among others. Many of these predictors are expensive to
Table IV.
Utilization analysis
MD Sorties (r) Hours flown (r)
A-10 0.913 0.909
AC-130 0.668 0.753
B-1 0.789 0.466
B-2 0.845 0.830
B-52 0.956 0.932
C-130 0.675 0.827
C-17 0.947 0.921
C-20 0.863 0.840
E-3 0.669 0.563
E-8 0.963 0.958
EC-130 0.509 0.484
F-117 0.327 0.283
F-15 0.983 0.949
F-15E 0.508 0.281
F-16 0.968 0.937
F-22 0.942 0.917
HC-130 0.785 0.852
HH-60 0.678 0.835
KC-135 0.736 0.305
MC-130 0.888 0.873
MH-53 0.902 0.937
MQ-1 0.923 0.922
MQ-9 0.989 0.987
RC-135 0.761 0.724
T-1 0.749 0.826
T-37 0.637 0.821
T-38 0.825 0.866
T-6 0.972 0.974
U-2 0.005 0.467
UH-1 0.561 0.770
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retroactively change, necessitating an examination of utilization to determine the return to
increasing available hours. Third, the data show available hours may be a limiting factor to
utilization of the USAF ﬂeet. Individual platform analysis by sorties and by hours ﬂown shows
strong correlation with utilization in the majority of platforms. This suggests that there is
potential for real readiness beneﬁts to increasing available hours. Quantifying those beneﬁts to
provide a comparison to the costs of increasing availability is the next logical step for future
research.
As with any research, there are limitations associated with the ﬁndings. Perhaps the
largest limitation is the exclusion of manpower as an explanatory variable in our regression
model. Some maintenance manpower data at the enterprise level were available for analysis;
however, we were unable to obtain manpower data speciﬁc to individual platforms. While
previous researchers were able to conduct a case study examining the relationship between
manpower and MC rates on the F-16 (Chimka and Nachtmann, 2007), this type of approach
was not feasible here. Additionally, the available manpower data we did obtain in this
research were only germane to the organically (not contractor logistically supported)
maintained platforms.While we did explore regression analysis with this limited manpower
data, it did not have enough variation to be signiﬁcant in the models. Future research should
explore the role of manpower if data can be obtained at the platform level for organically
maintained aircraft and the associated manpower related to contractor maintained aircraft.
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